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A Return from Exile in Sight? The Chagossians
and Their Struggle
Christian Nauvel*
“No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold,
or liberties… or exiled…but by the law of the land…” The Magna Carta.
“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.” The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope and Purpose
¶1

¶2

The right to remain in one’s own country is a basic human right that has existed in
one form or another since the times of King John and the Magna Carta. Although
nowadays the term “exile” is likely to conjure up images of those bygone days, it
unfortunately remains a current issue. In fact, recent history abounds with instances of
forcible relocation – essentially, exile – being perpetrated by even those who would be
the champions of human rights. This Note will present one such instance: the story of a
small group of Indian Ocean islanders who were forced to leave the place they called
home and prevented from ever returning. More specifically, this Note will examine the
legal battles they waged against the U.K., the U.S. and giant corporations, such as
Halliburton.
The principal goals in this endeavor are: (1) to popularize the facts surrounding the
Chagos Islanders’ forcible relocation; (2) to present and analyze the rulings handed down
by the various courts involved; (3) to propose alternative forums where the Chagossians
can take their case next; and (4) to generally make a case for the liability of both the U.S
and the U.K. governments. Regarding this last point, this Note will focus on the British
High Court of Justice’s ruling in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult.1 This Note argues that, along with a more
recent case dealing with substantially the same issues, 2 Bancoult stands for the principle
*

Christian J. Nauvel, 2007 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law; B.S. magna cum
laude in Physics and Political Science, Bates College, 2002. I would like to dedicate this article to my
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1
[2001] Q.B. 1067.
2
R (on the application of Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
[2006] EWHC 1038 Admin. 4093.
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that the Chagos Islanders’ forced displacement was an infringement on their basic human
rights. In other words, the decisions were simply a roundabout way of granting redress
for human rights violations. This Note also contends that the results in the British
Bancoult cases create a principle of customary international law, according to which
monetary damages are due to plaintiffs who have prevailed against a State for the
violation of their right not to be displaced; as long as the case is viewed in conjunction
with the monetary settlement paid by the British government soon after the islanders’
displacement.
B. The Chagos Archipelago Today
¶3

¶4

The Chagos Archipelago (“the Chagos”) is a small group of coral atolls in the
Indian Ocean, lying south of the equator, about halfway between India and Africa. Like
many of the surrounding island groups, it has been blessed with tropical weather,
beautiful sandy beaches, warm blue lagoons and lush vegetation. But the idyllic setting is
deceiving – for, far from being the next big tourist destination, the archipelago’s largest
island, Diego Garcia, is the site of the region’s principal U.S. Naval base. The island’s
airstrips can easily accommodate a full fleet of fighter planes, and its harbor often
provides shelter for some of the largest military vessels in the world. 3 But Diego
Garcia’s principal asset is clearly its location, being almost equidistant from several
geopolitical hotspots. A letter from the U.S. Department of State, dated 21 June 2000,
described the base as an “all but indispensable platform” for the fulfillment of defense
and security responsibilities in the Arabian Gulf, the Middle East, South Asia and East
Africa. 4 Diego Garcia has played a vital role in several key military endeavors: like the
1991 Gulf War, when it served as the starting point for most aerial missions;5 and more
recently, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, when it was used as a central support
facility. 6
The politics of the Chagos is a complicated affair, involving several players on the
international stage. The archipelago is currently under joint American and British
control, with the tiny Republic of Mauritius claiming sovereignty (somewhat halfheartedly) in the background. As can be imagined, governance under such conditions is a
delicate process. On the ground, the Americans control the base itself, while the British
are in charge of all the administrative aspects (the police, the court sys tem, as well as
work and entry permits). 7 Services are provided by another increasingly important
(though unofficial) player – the Base Operating Service Contractor (“BOSC”). The
BOSC is typically a multi- national corporation that is awarded a highly lucrative

3

Anonymous Contributors, Diego Garcia Under Occupation, in DIEGO GARCIA IN TIMES OF
GLOBALIZATION 158 (Ledikasyon pu Travayer, 2002).
4
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1075.
5
See the United States Navy Support Facility Diego Garcia website,
http://www.dg.navy.mil/2005/html/island_history.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2005).
6
Globalsecurity.org Website, Military, Diego Garcia “Camp Justice” 7°20’S 72°25’E, Diego Garcia
History, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/diego-garcia.htm (last visited November 13, 2005)
(“Coalition aircraft at Diego Garcia dropped more ordnance on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan
than any other unit during the war on terror”).
7
Diego Garcia Under Occupation, supra note 3, at 157-158.
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contract8 to do everything from serving food to building roads. Companies filling the
role of Diego Garcia’s BOSC have included international heavyweights such as BJS
International and Halliburton. 9 As for the island’s population, there are no longer any
permanent residents; everyone there being involved with the base in some way or other. 10
C. The Chagossians and their Plight
¶5

¶6

Before the arrival of the B-52s and aircraft carriers, the Chagos was a peaceful
cluster of islands whose inhabitants (known as the “Chagos Islanders” or “Chagossians”)
lived on Diego Garcia and two other atolls: Peros Banhos and Salomon. 11 The exact
number of Chagossians who resided there is still disputed to this day, but estimates range
from 800 to 1500. 12 They lived simple lives, dividing their time between fishing and
working on the coconut plantations where copra13 was produced. Though none of them
owned any land, 14 they had been in the Chagos for two, three or even four generations. 15
It therefore came as a shock to most Chagossians when, on an otherwise normal morning
in 1971, they were suddenly informed that they would be required to permanently leave
their homes in order to make way for the U.S. military base. The majority of those
living on Diego Garcia were shipped to Mauritius against their will, within days of
receiving the news. By 1973, even the islands of Peros Banhos and Solomon had been
completely evacuated. 16
It soon became clear that the decision had long been made to remove them. For
years, the Chagossians suspected that they had been the victims of an elaborate scheme,
concocted to give their removal the semblance of legality. 17 This suspicion was all but
confirmed thirty years later, when British Foreign Office documents regarding their
removal were unclassified. See, for example, this excerpt from a 1966 confidential
missive from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Commissioner of the BIOT in
the Seychelles:
“We are taking steps to acquire ownership of the land on the islands and
consider that it would be desirable… for the inhabitants to be given some
form of temporary residence permit. We could then more effectively take
the line in discussion that these people are Mauritians and Seychellois;
8

Currently BOSC contracts are seven years long. Id. at 158.
Id.
10
In 2002, the island had around 6500 occupants: 3500 American military personnel, 1600 civilians
(American and British) and 1400 foreign workers (Filipino and Mauritian). Id. at 155.
11
Some of the older literature still calls them “Ilois,” which means “island people” in Mauritian Creole,
but this term is no longer used, being considered derogatory.
12
See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult,
[2001] Q.B. 1067, 1078-1079.
13
A tough multi-purpose fiber extracted from coconut trees.
14
Because it was impossible for them to do so with the plantation company (Chagos Agalega Ltd.)
having been vested with title to the lands as a matter of private law. The history of the British Empire
abounds with examples of private companies owning islands or even whole countries in this way; the most
famous example is probably the British East India Company. Ex parte Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. 1067, 1079.
15
Id. at 1075.
16
R (on the application of Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
[2006] EWHC 1038 Admin. 4093, §§ 58-67.
17
Ex parte Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. 1067.
9
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that they are temporarily resident in BIOT for the purpose of making a
living on the basis of contract or day to day employment with the
companies engaged in exploiting the islands.”18

¶7

The fact that plans were being made for the islanders’ removal a whole five years before
it took place, shows how carefully the British were thinking about it. The tone of this
particular excerpt also shows that government officials were concerned about how this
procedure would be viewed by the outside world. The element of obfuscation is evident.
Upon their arrival in Mauritius, most Chagossians had nowhere to go, no money
and no employment prospects. 19 The hardships they endured, as well as the forced
removal itself, have served as the basis for legal action in both British and American
courts. The islanders have also sued for the authorities’ refusal to allow their return to
the Chagos, and the base contractors’ refusal to hire them. The actual claims presented
range from forced displacement to torture and genocide, via employment discrimination
and a multitude of torts. But these lawsuits have all emerged as part of the ongoing
struggle to obtain redress for what the Chagossians viewed as blatant violations of their
human rights.
D. Political and Historical Context of the Base’s Creation

¶8

¶9

In the mid-1960s, at the height of the cold war, the U.S. was in dire need of a naval
and military base that could provide quick access to the Middle East, South Asia and
Eastern Africa. With the communist threat rearing its head, the U.S. needed to make its
presence felt in the region. 20 The U.K., keen to reinforce its trans-Atlantic alliance, 21 held
secret talks with the U.S. about providing a location for such a base. In return, the
American government offered the British an $11 million subsidy on the Polaris
submarine nuclear deterrent. 22
Given its size and location, the Chagos Archipelago was an obvious choice for such
a project. 23 On top of the presence of the Chagossians on the islands, there were a few
potential political problems, but none of them were considered insurmountable. For
example, the U.S. wanted a long term deal, while the British had already committed to
decolonizing the region. Since the Chagos Archipelago was technically part of Mauritius
18

Id. at 1082.
Chagos Islanders v. The Attorney General, Her Majesty's British Indian Ocean territory
Commissioner, [2003] EWHC 2222, § 48.
20
Globalsecurity.org Website, Military, supra note 6, (“In the 1960s, America’s naval policy in the
Indian Ocean had many ingredients. The foremost was to deter Russia from interrupting the flow of oil
from the Persian Gulf countries to America and Europe… It entailed maintaining a naval presence in the
Persian Gulf and, and wherever possible, in the countries on the rim of the Indian Ocean, not only to secure
the sea lines of communication which criss-crossed the Indian Ocean but also to inject military force from
seaward if required.”
21
Many of the discussions on this topic took place (maybe unofficially) in the context of NATO. See
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ex parte Bancoult, 1080-81.
22
The Chagos Islands: A sordid tale, BBC News World Edition (Nov. 3, 2000),
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/uk_news/politics1005064.stm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
23
Although possibly not the first choice, since some documents point to the island of Aldebra, north of
Madagascar, as the number one pick. This idea was ultimately abandoned, however, because Aldebra is
the breeding ground for rare giant tortoises, whose mating habits would probably have been upset by the
military base. The authorities were clearly afraid of the negative publicity that ecologists would probably
have caused, had Aldebra been chosen. Id.
19
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(which was heading towards independence), acquiescing to the U.S.’s demands meant
that the islands would have to be separated, which was contrary to existing U.N.
Resolutions. 24 But separation was the favored solution because it was also a way to avoid
potential claims for sovereignty by Mauritius, which both the U.S. and the U.K. wanted
to steer clear of. 25 Rather than find mutually acceptable solutions to these problems, one
official advised a “policy of ‘quiet disregard,’ in other words, let’s forget about this one
until the United Nations challenge us on it.”26 Since such a challenge never took place,
the plans for the construction of an American base on Diego Garcia continued,
unaffected.
E. The Mechanics of the Chagossians’ Removal
¶10

For nearly 200 years, the Chagos had been governed as part of the British Colony
of Mauritius, despite the distance (about 800 miles) that separated one from the other. 27
But in November of 1965, on the eve of Mauritius’s independence, the archipelago was
unceremoniously carved away to create a separate entity, the British Indian Ocean
Territory (“BIOT”). This was accomplished by order of Her Majesty, the Queen of
England, through the issuance of what has become known as the “BIOT Order.”28
Though highly irregular, the British defended this decision by citing to their own
domestic laws, 29 which gave them close to unfettered discretion as to the make-up of
colonial boundaries. 30 The practical result of the Order was that, while Mauritius gained
its independence in 1968, the Chagos remained British (as did its population).
¶11
Amongst other things, the BIOT Order created the position of Commissioner.
Section 11 of the Order empowered the Commissioner to “make laws for the peace, order
and good governance of the Territory.”31 But instead, he used this authority to
promulgate BIOT Ordinance No. 1 of 1971 (also known as the “Immigration Ordinance
1971”). Section 4 of this ordinance provided for the compulsory removal of the whole
existing civilian population, for not possessing a government issued permit. 32 In order to
ensure minimal publicity, the Ordinance was pub lished only in the BIOT Gazette, which

24

Paragraph 6 of U.N. Resolution No. 1514 (Dec., 1960) reads that: “[a]ny attempt at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes
and the principles of the United Nations.” Id.
25
A document, dated 20 October 1964, and entitled “Defense Interests in the Indian Ocean” makes it
clear that: “It would be unacceptable to both the British and the American defense authorities if facilities of
the kind proposed were in any way to be subject to the political control of Ministers of a newly emergent
independent state (Mauritius is expected to become independent some time after 1966)… it is hoped that
the Mauritius Government may agree to have the islands being detached and directly administered by
Britain.” Id.
26
Id.
27
The Chagos Archipelago Islands were ceded by France to Great Britain by the Treaty of Paris in 1814
and from then until 1965, they were governed as part of the colony of Mauritius. Lindsey Collen & Ragini
Kistnasamy, How Diego Garcia was Depopulated and Stolen, in DIEGO GARCIA IN TIMES OF
GLOBALIZATION 26 (Ledikasyon pu Travayer, 2002).
28
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, 1076.
29
More specifically, to the Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895 which regulates the alteration of colonial
boundaries.
30
Ex parte Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. at 1076.
31
Id. (quoting § 11(1) of the BIOT Order of 1965).
32
Id. at 1077.
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had a very limited circulation. 33 Once the “immigration” procedure had been completed,
the British entered into a long term lease agreement with the U.S., and effectively
transferred possession of the Chagos in 1971. Despite the public outcry that this caused
in the newly independent state of Mauritius, the country’s leadership caused very little
fuss on the diplomatic front. 34 Whereas within the U.S. and the U.K, one was (and still
is) hard pressed to find anyone – other than active or former servicemen – who has even
heard of the Chagos Archipelago, let alone of the plight of its former inhabitants.
F. The Official Line
¶12

The official line from both the American and the British governments is that there
were no indigenous inhabitants on the Chagos, only contract workers. Hence, there was
no relocation, and the islanders were simply returned to their home countries after the
termination of their contracts. Although this sounds very plausible, the truth of this
position is belied by a collection of formerly classified documents. One such document
is a minute from a 1966 meeting involving the BIOT Commissioner and staff from the
British Colonial Office:
“[The Colonial Office wishes] to avoid using the phrase ‘permanent
inhabitants’ in relation to any of the islands in the territory because to
recognize that there are permanent inhabitants will imply that there is a
population whose democratic rights will have to be safeguarded and which
will therefore be deemed by the UN Committee of Twentyfour to come
within its purview… it may be necessary to issue [the inhabitants] with
documents making it clear that they are ‘belongers’ of Mauritius or the
Seychelles and only temporarily resident in the BIOT. This device,
though rather transparent, would at least give us a defensible position to
take up in the Committee of Twentyfour… It would be highly
embarrassing to us if, after giving the Americans to understand that the
islands in the BIOT would be available to them for defense purposes, we
then had to tell them that we proposed to admit that they fell within the
purview of the Committee of Twentyfour.”35

It would have been hard to contradict their publicly taken position in a blunter fashion.
Further examination of the recently unc lassified documents shows that the British were
well aware of two major flaws in their official stance.
¶13
First, the Chagossians had been there for generations; as can be seen from the
following 1965 British Foreign Office memorandum:

33

Id. at 1086.
Over the years, several possible explanations have been proposed for this passivity. One of them is
that Mauritian leaders were intimidated by the formidable stature of its adversaries. Another is that they
were appeased by preferential trade agreements – for at the time, Mauritius’ sole source of income was
from the sugar that it produced and it was still very much dependent on its former colonizers in this respect.
More than likely, the true reason is some mixture of the two. Given the country's continued economic ties
to both the U.K. (in terms of sugar and tourism) and the U.S (a major market for its textiles) the situation is
the same nowadays.
35
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, 1082.
34
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“Our understanding is that… a small number of the people [on the islands]
were born there and, in some cases, their parents were born there too. The
intention is, however that none of them should be regarded as being
permanent inhabitants of the islands… [they] will be evacuated as and
when defence [sic] interests require this....”36
¶14

Second, at least a few British officials had realized property rights have little to do
with the right to remain in one’s own country. In a 1967 missive to the Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Affairs, the Officer Administering the Government of Mauritius
wrote:
“I am not sure myself about the validity of the argument that the Ilois have
lived in Chagos ‘only on sufferance of the owners,’ since the point at issue
is ‘belonging’ in a national sense rather than rights of residence on private
property.”37
Hence, the circumstances under which the islands were prepared for the construction of
the military facility are highly contentious, to say the least.
II. THE BRITISH CASES
A. The Lawsuit

¶15

The Chagossians were long frustrated in their attempts to obtain legal redress for all
of their grievances, mainly because of British secrecy laws. But in 1998, after some of
the relevant documents had finally been made public, a Chagossian by the name of
Olivier Bancoult filed suit in England. 38 In his complaint, he requested that the
Commissioner (on behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) declare unlawful
both the Ordinance and the policy which had prevented him from returning to and
residing in the Chagos. 39 The judges on the Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative
Court) ruled in his favor, quashing part of the 1971 Ordinance and theoretically allowing
the Chagossians to return home. However, in practice, many barriers remained, such as
getting the U.S. to alter the terms of its lease.
1. The Parties and their Claims

¶16

The applicant was a BIOT citizen and a former inhabitant of Peros Banhos in the
Chagos Archipelago. 40 He was born in there, as were his parents before him. In 1967,
his family took an extended trip to Mauritius in order to seek medical treatment for his
younger sister who had been injured in an accident. They did not return before the
Immigration Ordinance of 1971 was passed, after which they were prevented from doing

36

Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1085.
38
Id. at 1067.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1070.
37
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so. Hence, Mr. Bancoult has never returned to the archipelago, and still resides in
Mauritius.
¶17
Mr. Bancoult’s first step was to seek a determination by the BIOT Commissioner
on the legality of the Immigration Ordinance (which purported to authorize the
banishment of all BIOT citizens) and the policy adopted under the Ordinance (which
prevented them from returning). In June and August of 1998, on behalf of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, the Commissioner ruled that both the ordinance and the
resulting policy were indeed valid. 41 Not to be so easily deterred, in March of the
following year Mr. Bancoult sought an order of certiorari to quash the Commissioner’s
decisions.
¶18
Though too lengthy to elaborate on in this Note, the arguments made in this
application remain the clearest and most complete articulation of the Chagossians’ case to
date. Amongst other things, it was argued that the Crown could not exclude a British
citizen from a British territory, because save in times of war, the Queen had no power to
abridge the liberty of her subjects without the authority of a valid statute or an established
common law prerogative. 42 It was also argued that a British subject had a fundamental
(or constitutional) right to reside in the territory of which he was a citizen and that such a
right could be abrogated by neither the general words of the BIOT Order 43 nor any action
of the Commissioner, whose legislative powers were only delegated. 44 Alternatively, it
was argued that the policy followed after the enactment of the BIOT order was unla wful
and disproportionate, because the words “for the peace, order and good government”45
limited the Commissioner’s otherwise plenary powers. Since the removal of a territory’s
entire population could hardly be for its “good government,” the ordinance was ultra
vires.46 Mr. Bancoult’s attorneys also argued that the legislation was repugnant to Article
29 of the Magna Carta, 47 and was an affront to articles 3, 8 and 5 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (also known
as the European Convention on Human Rights “ECHR”). 48
¶19
The respondents in this case were the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the
Commissioner for the BIOT, both located in London, England. They opposed each one
of the applicant’s claims and added several arguments of their own. They first argued
that English courts had no jurisdiction over the case because the Crown was divisible and

41

Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1070.
42
Id. at 1071 (citing Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr. 1029).
43
Id. (citing Nissan v. Attorney General [1970] AC 179 and Rayner (J H) (Mincing Lane) Ltd v.
Department of Trade and Industry [1989] Ch 72).
44
Id. at 1072 (citing R. v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham [1998] QB 575).
45
As required by the British Settlements Act, 50 & 51 Vict. C 54 (1887), which applies because a
population of U.K. citizens was residing in the Chagos by the time the BIOT was created.
46
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067.
47
Id. (citing the Magna Carta, 25 Edw. 1 c 1, Art. 29 (1297)(U.K.) (according to which no freeman can
be outlawed or exiled except by the law of the land – meaning an act of parliament or common law rule –
not an executive order from a Governor or Commissioner)).
48
Which provided for a “right to protection from inhuman and degrading treatment, [a] right to respect
for [one’s ] private and family life and home, and [a] right to [the] liberty and security of [one’s] person.
Id. at 1072 (citing the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (1953)).
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was to be treated as a separate sovereign entity in every single territory49 and the BIOT
had its own courts of competent jurisdiction. 50 According to them, the use of an English
court would raise the possibility of conflicting judicial opinions being issued, since an
appeal would ultimately lead to the House of Lords, while an appeal from the BIOT
Supreme Court is to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 51
¶20
Regarding the substantive issues in the case, the respondents claimed (amongst
other things) that the population of the Chagos had no absolute right to reside there since
they had no proprietary interest in the land. Because the plantation owners had been
relieved of their freehold by the Crown, this put the applicant in the same position as
someone who was forced to move upon the appropriation of his land for public
purposes. 52 Even if a fundamental right to reside in the Chagos was found to exist, the
respondents argued that the Commissioner was empowered to enact the 1971 Ordinance,
in spite of any conflicts this created with English or international law. 53 The reasoning
behind this was that: if a special rule of construction (which protects fundamental or
constitutional rights) were to be applied, it would undercut the Colonial Laws Validity
Act of 1865 (“CLVA”), which provides that colonial laws are void only to the extent that
they are repugnant to an Act of Parliament, specifically applicable to that colony. 54
¶21
With respect to the vires of the BIOT Order, the respondents claimed that the words
“make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory” gave the
Commissioner the widest law- making powers. 55 As for the Magna Carta, they argued
that it did not apply to the BIOT because it was not an “Act of Parliament” within the
meaning of the CLVA, which in turn meant that it did not extend beyond England. 56 The
respondents also argued that the applicant could obtain no relief under international law
because: (i) he had no rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (since the
U.K. had not declared it to apply to the BIOT); 57 and (ii) he had no rights under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 or even the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights of 1977 (as they had not been ratified by the U.K. with respect
to the BIOT). Finally, the respondents argued that the English Court could not require
the U.K. to breach its treaty obligations to the U.S. by invalidating the Order. 58
2. The Court’s Holdings
¶22

The High Court of Justice delivered its judgment on November 3, 2000. The
judges on the panel were Lord Justice Laws (who wrote the majority of the opinion) and
49

One of the many legal fictions that enabled the British to have different standards of governance at
home and in the colonies.
50
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1072 (citing R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex parte Indian
Association of Alberta [1982] QB 892).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1074.
53
Id. at 1073 (citing Phillips v. Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1).
54
Id. (citing Liyanage v. the Queen [1967] 1 AC 259).
55
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1073-1074 (citing Ibralebbe v. The Queen (1885) 10 App. Cas. 675).
56
Id. (citing the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, 28 & 29 Vict. c 63, § 2 (1865)(U.K.) and the
Magna Carta, 25 Edw. 1 c 1, Art. 29 (1297)(U.K.)).
57
Id. at 1074 (citing Bui van Thanh v. U.K. (unreported) 12 March 1990).
58
Id. (citing Blackburn v. Attorney General [1971] 1 WLR 1037).
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Mr. Justice Gibbs. They ruled upon three main issues. The first of these was procedural
– dealing with whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The second issue was
more substantive, for it asked whether the Ordinance infringed on the applicant’s
constitutional rights (with respect to the Magna Carta and a citizen’s fundamental right to
reside in his or her country of “belonging”). The third issue concerned the validity of the
1971 Ordinance.
¶23
With respect to jurisdiction, the court ruled that while the proceedings were indeed
directed against an act of the BIOT legislature and the Crown was indeed “divisible,” the
combination of these two factors did not establish that the Court had no power to
determine the Ordinance’s legality. 59 All that the respondents did, in the court’s opinion,
was make an argument of discretion, in an attempt to persuade the judges that the BIOT
Supreme Court would be the most convenient forum for the resolution of this dispute. 60
But Lord Justice Laws was not persuaded, describing another of the respondents’
arguments (the possibility of conflicting judicial opinion at the highest level) as “more
apparent than real.”61 After weighing all the elements involved, the court concluded that
it had “ample jurisdiction” over the case, describing the respondents’ arguments as “an
abject surrender of substance to form.”62 Although it upheld the constitutional principle
that the Crown was indeed divisible, the court reasoned that the Ordinance was quite
clearly the work of the British governme nt – since the BIOT government’s every move
was choreographed from the Foreign Office in London. 63
¶24
The court then turned to the substantive question of whether to quash the Ordinance
or not. The first issue considered was whether the Ordinance ran contrary to the rights
and liberties enshrined in the Magna Carta. 64 The respondents had argued that the Magna
Carta did not apply to a foreign territory such as the BIOT. The court disagreed, finding
that the document was “the nearest approach to an irrepealable ‘fundamental statute’ that
England has ever had… For in brief it means this, that the King is and shall be below the
law.”65 However, despite his belief that the Magna Carta “followed the flag” abroad,
Lord Justice Laws did not think that it resolved this case in the applicant’s favor – for it
could not condemn an act that was done in accordance with the law. 66 And although
there were questions as to the Ordinance’s vires, if they were to be resolved in the
respondents’ favor, the Magna Carta would be powerless.
¶25
The second substantive issue taken up by the court was whether the applicant
enjoyed a constitutional right to reside in or to return to that part of the Queen’s
dominions of which he was a citizen or a “belonger,” and if it existed, whether this right
59

Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1086.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1087.
62
Id.
63
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1087.
64
The relevant portion of which states that: “No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of
his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will
we pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land…” Id.
(citing the Magna Carta, 25 Edw. 1 c 1, Art. 29 (1297)(U.K.) (modernized version) in Halsbury’s Statutes
of England and Wales, 4th Ed. Vol. 10 (1995)).
65
Id. at 1095 (citing Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1, 173 (1923)).
66
Id. at 1094-1095.

105

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

[2006

could be infringed upon by such general words as those present in §11 of the BIOT
Order.67 The Court held if a constitutional right were to be found in this case, the State
would not be authorized to abrogate it, save by specific parliamentary provision. 68
However, while Lord Justice Laws stated that “[f]or my part, I would certainly accept
that a British subject enjoys a constitutional right to reside in or return to that part of the
Queen’s dominions of which he is a citizen,” he did not rule in favor of the applicant on
this issue. 69
¶26
The reasons behind his decision tie back to the concept that the Crown is divisible.
The court agreed with the respondents that under the ordinary rules of constitutional
construction, colonial legislators were given free reign to create laws on any subject, as
long as they did not offend that territory’s fundamental principles – which were separate
from those constitutional rights protected in England. 70 In most cases, because the
colonies adopted written constitutions that mirrored the rights guaranteed in England,
there would be no practical difference. However, the BIOT was an exception in that it
had no such written constitution. 71 The court also agreed with the respondents that the
CLVA did not permit any special rule of construction that would allow for the protection
of fundamental English rights in a colony – which allowed them to prevail on this issue. 72
¶27
The final set of substantive issues dealt with by the court was related to the legal
nature of the 1971 Ordinance. The court first held that it was “elementary” that “a
legislature created by a measure passed by a body which is legally prior to it must act
within the confines of the power thereby conferred.”73 In other words, the BIOT
“government” (i.e. the Commissioner) could only wield as much power as was granted to
it by the BIOT Order. The contrary “would invite our entry into a barbarous world where
there is no rule of law.”74 Hence, the Ordinance could be challenged as ultra vires if it
was found not to be for the “peace, order and good government of the territory,” which
was the upper limit of the Commissioner’s lawmaking power.
¶28
This issue of whether the §11 of BIOT Order empowered §4 of the Ordinance
turned out to be determinative of the case. 75 The respondent argued that in colonial laws,
the phrase “peace, order, and good government” should be taken as having the widest
possible intendment. 76 However, the court found that despite being so broadly
empowered, the Commissioner had exceeded the bounds of his authority. In other words,
there was no conceivable standard under which §4 of the Ordinance could be considered

67

Id. at 1095-1096.
This is called the “principle of legality,” which forces Parliament to take responsibility for its actions
by accepting the political costs involved. Such a principle is a necessity in common law countries where
legislative supremacy continues to be accorded, allowing Parliament to legally create legislation that
blatantly contradicts fundamental principles of human rights if it so chooses. Hence, the only real check on
the legislature in the British system of parliamentary sovereignty is the public. Regina v. Secretary of State
for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001] Q.B. 1067,1096.
69
Id. at 1097.
70
Id. at 1098 (citing Liyanage v. The Queen [1967] 1 AC 259, 283).
71
Id. at 1099-1100.
72
Id. at 1098-1100.
73
Id. at 1100.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1102.
76
Id. at 1102-1103 (citing Riel v. The Queen, [1885] 10 App. Cas. 675).
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to advance the “peace, order, and good government” of the BIOT. 77 So, despite
understanding the political and security-based reasons behind the inhabitants’ removal,
the court quashed §4 of the 1971 Ordinance.
B. Analysis of the Holdings and International Human Rights Implications
1. General Views
¶29

Though the High Court’s ultimate holding was probably the right one, readers
might be forgiven for being a little disappointed. The opinion certainly begs the question
of whether the protection of rights as fundamental as those at stake in this case, must be
such an intricate, procedurally heavy affair. After all, the facts were clear. As Justice
Gibbs put it in his concurring opinion: “[i]t is beyond argument that the purposes of the
BIOT Order and Ordinance were to facilitate the use of Diego Garcia as a strategic
military base and to restrict the use and occupation of that and the other islands within
that territory to the extent necessary to ensure the effectiveness and security of the
base.”78 British government employees demonstrated not only “official zeal… [that]
went beyond any proper limits,” but also an awareness of the moral turpitude involved in
their actions, which they tried to hide from both the public and the U.N. 79 But in spite of
these strong statements, an astute reader will have no doubt come to the following
conclusion: had the BIOT Order been more explicit in terms of the absolut e power it
intended to confer on the Commissioner, the High Court would probably have declared
the Ordinance valid; flying in the face of every major human rights instrument ever
signed by the British government.
2. Continued Adherence to the Colonial Laws Validity Act

¶30

To those who feel very strongly about the protection of human rights, several
aspects of the court’s reasoning may be quite troubling. The continued support given to
legislation such as the CLVA is a prominent example. The Act is a remnant of British
imperialism that, some would argue, has no place in this day and age. It was enacted in
1865,80 and basically provides that colonial laws should only be voided to the extent that
they are repugnant to an Act of the British parliament that is specifically applicable to
that colony. 81 It also stood for the rule that colonial laws should not be voided on the
grounds of repugnancy to the law of England. 82

77

This is because every such standard had to be judged from the perspective of the territory’s population
– making it impossible to imagine how removing the inhabitants from the place they called home could be
an example of “good government” (other than if there had been some disaster that rendered the land
uninhabitable). Id. at 1104.
78
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1106.
79
Id. at 1107.
80
After “considerable difficulties had been caused by the over-insistence of a colonial judge in South
Australia that colonial legislative acts must not be repugnant to English law… [The] Act was intended to
and did overcome the difficulties.” Id. at 1098, citing to Sir Kenneth Wheare, The Statute of Westminster
and Dominion Status, 4th Ed. (1949), pp. 75, 76, 77.
81
Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, 28 & 29 Vict. c 63, § 2 (1865)(U.K.).
82
Id. at § 3.
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¶31

The court essentially reaffirmed the ability of colonial governments to ignore the
rights guarant eed by either “the common law or English traditions of fair treatment.” 83
That the English court felt obliged to grant such a law as the CLVA so much deference,
should be concerning to anyone with even a fleeting interest in human rights. Of course,
part of the logic behind the court’s conclusion was that fundamental rights would
normally be protected by a colony’s own written constitution. However, the justices
stuck to their conclusion, despite acknowledging that the BIOT had adopted no such
document. After having (quite rightly) accused the respondents of “an abject surrender of
substance to form” on the question of jurisdiction, the court unfortunately seemed to
engage in similar behavior on this issue. 84
¶32
One explanation for the court’s conclusion may have been the feeling that it was
unnecessary to upset settled law when the Ordinance could be invalidated on other
grounds. Clearly, the judges were unwilling to dismantle centuries of colonial
jurisprudence – most notably the fiction according to which the Crown is “divisible”–
despite the fact that this allowed colonial legislation to violate basic human rights.
Another explanation may have been the desire to protect the administration of the
remaining British territories, while also shielding the U.K. from the potential liability
represented by thousands of former colonial subjects.
¶33
Whatever the reasons behind it, continued adherence to the laws such as the CLVA
has the potential to be disastrous to the protection of human rights – allowing the British
government to accept very little responsibility for the inhumane laws passed in its
colonies. The court’s decision would have been improved immensely, had it discredited
the CLVA and other laws like it. 85 The judges could have done so by citing to the
numerous potential conflicts with other Acts of Parliament (aimed at protecting all British
citizens irrespective of where they live) and to the contradictory commitments made by
the British government on the international level. 86
3. The Legitimacy of the BIOT Order
¶34

The court accorded relief to the appellant by invalidating §4 of the 1971 Ordinance,
while leaving the BIOT Order intact. Another, more intellectually honest, way of coming
to the same conclusion could have been to hold that no matter how it was worded, the
BIOT Order could never authorize such a violation of the Chagossians’ rights. This issue
was skirted around many times in the opinion, but never addressed with any finality. 87
Both Lord Justice Laws and Justice Gibbs agreed that the BIOT Order was made under
the powers of the royal prerogative. 88 The Court then came very close to accepting the
applicant’s argument that this prerogative did not permit the Chagossians’ exile. 89 But

83

Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1103.
84
Id. at 1092.
85
I say “discredit,” because I recognize how hard it would be for the Court to repeal the Act completely.
86
For example, the ratification of instruments such as the UDHR and the ICCPR
87
See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
Q.B. 1067, 1105-1106.
88
Id. at 1106.
89
Id. at 1105 (“ … I entertain considerable doubt whether the prerogative power extends so far as to
permit the Queen in Council to exile her subjects from the territory to which they belong”).
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despite having uncovered sufficient authority to do so, 90 and despite confidently declaring
in another portion of the opinion that “the King is and shall be below the law,” 91 it shied
away at the last moment.
¶35
Yet another argument that the court did not entertain was that the BIOT Order
might be illegal, for violating U.N. procedure and policy. It is understandable that the
English court did not want to act as the enforcer of U.N. agreements, especially when the
organization itself had made no formal complaints. Nevertheless, the court could have
found that the vio lation of an international agreement approved by Parliament (in this
case, the U.N. Charter 92 ) and the misrepresentation involved in creating the law (to both
the public and to the international community) were sufficient to put the validity of the
Order in doubt.
¶36
As will be seen later on in this Note, the High Court’s failure to rule on the legality
of the BIOT Order itself has had a devastating (but somewhat predictable) effect on the
Chagossians’ victory in Bancoult.
4. Bancoult as a Principle of Customary International Law
¶37

Despite the High Court’s reluctance to confront its government’s actions head on, it
could not turn a blind eye on the evidence; which pointed to British defense interests
being put ahead of the basic human rights of its citizens. Hence, it ruled in favor of the
applicant. The fact that the British government decided to accept the Court’s decision
without appealing might say something about how just the outcome was. Perhaps part of
the reason why the decision feels so “just” is that it does more than simply invalidate an
ordinance. Reading between the lines, the decision seems to be a roundabout way of
granting redress for human rights violations, without explicitly accusing the British
government of such infringements.
¶38
According to scholars such as Myres McDougal and Norbert Schlei, International
law is not static or absolute, but rather “a living, growing, customary law, grounded in the
claims, practices and sanctioning expectations of nation-states…”93 In their seminal
article, “The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective Lawful Measures for Security,” they
argued that the 1954 Nuclear tests conducted by the U.S. in the Marshall Islands were
lawful under the laws of the sea and thus international law. 94 Their conclusions were
essentially based upon a test of reasonableness which drew liberally from the doctrine of
self-defense. 95 The article caused shock-waves of its own amongst international legal
scholars of the time – both because of its unilateral defense of actions that seemed to
90

Id. (“I have in mind those passages in Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. 1, p 137 and Chitty’s treatise,
pp 18,21, and the argument of Dr. Plender in International Migration Law, ch 4, p 133…).
91
Id. at 1095 (citing Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd Ed. Vol. 1, 173 (1923)).
92
Article 73 requires (amongst other things) that the interests of the inhabitants of non-self-governing
territories be “paramount.” The governing nation has the obligation to ensure the population’s “just
treatment, and their protection against abuses.” The nation is also required to “develop self-government”
amongst the people living in such a territory.
93
See Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 648-663, 682-688 (1955) in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE , W. Michael Reisman et al. 39 (Foundation Press, 2004) (specifically
referring to the laws of the sea).
94
Id. at 37-44.
95
Id.
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violate U.N. policy, and because of its ultra- flexible interpretation of international law.
The authors saw sources of international law as lying not only in “international
conventions” that established expressly recognized rules, but also in “international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law….”96 They claimed that State
action sometimes spoke even louder than the words embodied in legal texts. Sure
enough, when the Soviet Union conducted its own hydrogen bomb tests over the Pacific,
several commentators noticed this very effect on international customary law. 97
¶39
Though McDougal and Schlei would probably shudder at this application of their
theory, scholars, such as Anthony D’Amato have suggested that other forms of State
action can also be seen to create legal precedent in this way. 98 For example, during the
same 1954 U.S. nuclear tests, some unfortunate Japanese fishermen wandered into the
“cordoned off” zone and were irradiated. 99 Under the table, the U.S. gave the fishermen
millions of dollars, labeling it a “gift” and refusing to accept any liability. 100
Commentators such as D’Amato argue that although there was never even an opinion
issued in that case, such an action by the U.S. government established that they were, in
fact liable. 101
¶40
Using similar logic, this Note argues that the British Bancoult case can be used as
an international precedent against forced relocation. As will be discussed in more detail
below, significant compensation has been paid to the Chagossians by the British
government over the years; although not in connection with a court ruling of liability. 102
Bancoult is the ruling that was missing in order to connect the payments made by the
U.K. to specific acts. Hence, one can make the argument that States which infringe this
customary rule should be liable for monetary damages.
C. Repercussions of the British Bancoult Ruling
1. Lack of Practical Results
¶41

The practical results of the Chagossians’ victory in Bancoult have unfortunately
been few and far between. Despite deciding to accept the court’s decision, the British
government was only prepared to let people return to the Chagos Archipelago’s outer
islands (not Diego Garcia), due to “security considerations.”103 This presented an
96

Id. at 40.
Falk, for e.g. wrote that the nuclear testing “created permissive precedents that are very difficult to
repudiate.” Richard A. Falk, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 452 (Princeton University
Press, 1970).
98
Notes from Anthony D’Amato’s Spring 2005 International Law Class at the Northwestern University
School of Law, Chicago, IL.
99
See the statement of Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, regarding the
miscalculation of the test’s effects, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1954, at 20.
100
See 32 Dept. St. Bull. 90 (1955) (reprinting the note of Jan. 4, 1955, from U.S. Amb assador John M.
Allison to Japanese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu).
101
D’Amato, supra note 98.
102
In 1973, the British government paid the sum of £650,000 to the Mauritian government, which in
turn distributed it amongst the Chagossians. In 1982, the sum of £4 million was disbursed in a similar
fashion. See Chagos Islanders v. The Attorney General, Her Majesty's British Indian Ocean territory
Commissioner, [2003] EWHC 2222, §§ 51-80.
103
Ragini Kistnasamy & Lindsay Collen, Sityasyon Chagosyen Zordi, in DIEGO GARCIA IN TIMES OF
GLOBALIZATION 135 (Ledikasyon pu Travayer, 2002) (citing the Q&A session in the British Parliament on
13 November, 2000).
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immediate problem, for other than Diego Garcia, the islands have been uninhabited for
30 years. They therefore lack all basic amenities and infrastructure. With this in mind,
the U.K. parliament commissioned a “feasibility study” on the subject of the
Chagossians’ return, but progress was slow. 104 A preliminary feasibility study was
produced on 20 June 2000; and following the collection of data, a more complete report
was published on 10 July 2002. 105 It concluded that while resettlement on a short-term
subsistence basis was possible, long term resettlement would be “precarious and
costly.”106 The Chagossians decided that something more needed to be done in order to
prevent their struggle from stalling indefinitely.
2. The Chagos Islanders Case for Compensation
¶42

A group of Chagos Islanders provided the necessary impetus by filing a class action
tort suit in the British High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division), in April 2002. 107
This presented them with the opportunity to finally have their day in court and to give
oral evidence about the circumstances of their removal. 108 In essence, the claimants
sought “(i) compensation and restoration of their property rights, in respect to their
unlawful removal or exclusion from the Chagos islands… and, (ii) declarations of their
entitlement to return to all Chagos islands and to measures facilitating their return.”109
They alleged that the Attorney General and the BIOT Commissioner had committed six
separate wrongs: misfeasance in public office, unlawful exile, negligence, infringement
of property rights, infringement of rights under the Mauritian constitution and deceit. 110
¶43
The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that there were no reasonable
grounds for the claims. They contended that the claimants did not satisfy the
requirements of the pleaded cause of action, pleaded causes that were unknown to
English law, or relied on the laws of Mauritius, which were irrelevant to the BIOT. The
defendants also argued that the claimants were barred by the statute of limitations and
that their claims constituted an abuse of process. 111
¶44
The abuse of process argument especially, proved to be a major stumbling block to
the Chagossians’ case. The argument arose because of the following facts: in 1982, a
settlement agreement was signed between representatives of the Chagossians and the
U.K. The impetus for this agreement came from a case filed in the High Court in London
by a Chagossian by the name of Michel Vencatessen, in 1975. He had alleged damages
in connection with his departure from Diego Garcia, the voyage and subsequent events.
The action led to the recognition that the Chagossians needed to be offered some sort of
104

Id.
R (on the application of Bancoult) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
[2006] EWHC 1038 Admin. 4093, § 84.
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Id.
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The claimants were split into two sub-groups: those residing in Mauritius and Agalega (represented
by the Chagos Refugees Group, chaired by Olivier Bancoult) and those residing in the Seychelles
(represented by the Chagos Social Committee, chaired by Jeanette Alexis). See Chagos Islanders, [2003]
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Id. at §§ 164-213.
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group compensation. Several organizations were formed (in Mauritius) to represent the
interests of the Chagossians, which led to a lot of confusion and a very slow negotiation
process. The British government made several settlement offers (starting with £500,000
in 1978) before eventually agreeing to pay the sum of £4 million (in addition to £650,000
that had already paid to the Chagossians back in 1977-1978). This figure was accepted
by the Chagossians representatives (the Ilois Trust Fund Board) and the Mauritian
government. The understanding, at least on the British side, was that this payment would
settle all the Chagossians’ claims both present and future and Mr. Vencatessen withdrew
his damages suit. 112
¶45
Hence, the Chagos Islanders case was the first time that a court was called upon
to rule on the issue of compensation. In late 2003, the British High Court handed down
its judgment. In an extensive opinion, Mr. Justice Ouseley retraced the entire history of
the litigation, analyzing 15 principal issues and eventually finding against the claimants
on every single one. The court held that despite the unlawfulness of the 1971 Ordinance,
there was no prospect of the claimants showing that the defendants had been reckless in
enacting it, or that they knew it was unlawful during enforcement. 113 The court also ruled
that there was neither an arguable tort of unlawful exile, nor a duty of care to take
reasonable steps for the well-being of the claimants. 114 It held that the claimants had no
remaining property interests, for any such rights had either been acquired by the Crown
for a public purpose or extinguished by a later Ordinance. 115 The Constitution of
Mauritius was found to be inapplicable to any part of the BIOT and therefore powerless
to override BIOT legislation. 116 The court also remained unconvinced that the elements
of the tort of deceit could ever be proven. 117 On top of everything else, the judges
believed that the claimants had no prospects of recovery in view of the Limitation Act of
1980 (equivalent to a U.S. statute of limitations), and the fact that the proceedings
involved an abuse of process for at least some of the claimants. 118 Finally, the court held
that the questions raised by the defendant did not specifically cover the right to return to
Diego Garcia, the right to receive assistance in doing so, or the right to achieve a certain
lifestyle there. 119 Hence, the defendants’ application for summary judgment was
granted. 120
¶46
The result of this case, though discouraging for the Chagossians, does not
adversely affect the theoretical argument that the British Bancoult case could be used as a
principle of international customary law. This is because the Chagos Islanders case was
conducted completely within the sphere of British tort law. Though the Court did not
accept the existence of a tort of unlawful exile, it did not rule that forced displacement
112

Id. at §§ 54-56, 60-69.
Id. at §§ 738-39.
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Id. at § 740-41.
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prior to 1967. Id. at § 742.
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Id. at § 743.
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118
The Court found that some of them had knowingly signed away their right to litigate on these issues
in 1982. Id. at §§ 745-746.
119
Such rights were found to be unarguable on the basis pleaded. Id. at § 747.
120
Id. at § 748.
113

112

Vol. 5:1]

Christian Nauvel

was legal. Nor does the result affect the contention that compensation is required for a
finding of forced displacement, because as previously mentioned, one of the principal
reasons why the tort action failed was that compensation had already been paid by the
British government.
3. The Second British Bancoult Case: An End of the Legal Battle in the U.K?
¶47

The Chagos Islanders case was heard on appeal in July of 2004. Unfortunately for
the claimants, the judgment of the lower court was upheld, bringing “to an end the quest
of the displaced inhabitants of the Chagos Islands and their descendants for legal redress
against the state directly responsible for expelling them from their homeland.”121
However, this statement was not an accurate prediction, for the state’s subsequent actions
were to cause at least one more lawsuit in the U.K.
¶48
The appellate court’s decision in the Chagos Islanders case came about a month
after an equally large (if not larger) setback. On 10 June 2004, Her Majesty in Council
promulgated the British Indian Ocean Territory Order 2004 (“Constitution Order”). The
similarities to the 1971 Ordinance were striking. It declared that “no person has the right
of abode in BIOT nor the right without authorisation [sic] to enter and remain there.”122
The Constitution Order also made it an offence (punishable by three years of
imprisonment) to be present in the territory without a permit. 123
¶49
Readers will recall that in the original Bancoult case the High Court shied away (at
the last minute) from invalidating the BIOT Order and from holding that the Royal
prerogative did not include the right to exile the Queen’s subjects from the territory to
which they belonged. Hence, this new Order was consistent with prior caselaw, yet it
was able to nullify any concrete gains made by the original Bancoult case. The
Chagossians were thus exiled once again; and since this time, they had been banished by
an actual Order from the Queen of England (as opposed to an Ordinance issued by the
BIOT Commissioner) it was presumed to be legal, pursuant to the Royal prerogative. 124
¶50
The Constitution Order was challenged by Mr. Bancoult in 2006 in front of the
Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court). 125 He argued that “the making of the
impugned Orders was unjustified and irrational in June 2004 given that the Foreign
Secretary had stated four years previously that the Chagossians would be allowed to
return to the outer islands consistently with the UK’s Treaty obligations. Nothing has
been put before the court to justify the alteration of that position in the intervening
years.”126 The court liked this argument, seeing “no good public law reason why [it could
not] assess irrationality in a case of this kind….”127 Furthermore, it decided that
irrationality had to be judged by reference to the interests of BIOT as opposed to those of
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the U.K. 128 Those interests “must be or must primarily be those whose right of abode and
unrestricted right to enter and remain was being in effect removed.”129
¶51
Amongst other things, the government relied (once again) on the CLVA as a
defense, submitting that “it defeats any challenge to the Order.”130 But the court
disagreed. It found that according to the modern approach to the judicial review of
executive action, the Constitution Order could be challenged. 131 The CLVA did not
preclude Bancoult’s public law irrationality challenge, since it “is not based on
repugnancy to the principles of English law but on vires.”132 Hence, the Chagossians
regained their right (in principle) to return home, which was essence of the original
Bancoult ruling.
¶52
It is also worthwhile to briefly note that Mr. Bancoult’s counsel once again put
forward a number of reasons why the order should be invalidated based on the ECHR and
customary international law. 133 But the English court did not find it necessary to address
these issues, given its ultimate conclusion. 134 However, given this conclusion, the second
Bancoult case only reinforces our theory with respect to the creation of a customary rule
of international law. Once again, reading between the lines of the English Court’s
decision, we discover embarrassment (revulsion even) as to its government’s actions.
Though not mentioned explicitly in the opinion, it is possible to view the result as a
judgment against the British government for the violation of international human rights.
¶53
Though the above rulings may indeed be the end of the road for the Chagossians’ in
terms of litigation against the U.K. in its national courts, by the time the opinions were
issued, the islanders had already turned their sights elsewhere. They had realized that
several key issues could only be resolved in the U.S. For example, even if they have the
right to return to the Chagos, now that the plantations are gone, they have no employment
prospects – other than to work on the military base. However, the facility (run by
Halliburton) has never accepted job applications from Chagossians and a change in
policy has not been forthcoming. If the base were to be decommissioned, other avenues
could be explored, such as a return to agriculture or even a shift to tourism. The next
logical step for the Chagossians was therefore to file suit in the United States.
III. THE AMERICAN CASE
A. Background and Procedural History
1. Introduction
¶54

In 2001, a group of Chagossians filed a civil suit for damages in the U.S. In
December of 2004, the case was dismissed by the District Court for the District of
Columbia on several grounds, but most notably that the issue was a “political question”
and therefore non-justiciable. 135 In April of 2006 the case’s dismissal was affirmed on
128
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appeal. 136 This case presented the Chagossia ns with a whole different set of issues and in
some ways was even more discouraging that the failed British tort suit, for here they were
not even allowed to present their substantive claims. However, the silver lining to this
cloud may well be that because there was no jurisdiction, the gains of the British
Bancoult cases (in terms of it potentially being a principle of customary international
law) remain unaltered. All we are left with is an American court that refused to apply
international law domestically.
2. The Parties and Their Arguments
¶55

Though Mr. Bancoult was again at the forefront of the Chagossian cause, the
plaintiffs in this action actually included a total of three individuals and two
organizations. One of the individual plaintiffs was Mrs. Mein, a native Chagossian who
claimed that in 1971 and 1972, persons acting on behalf of the U.S. and British
governments forced her family to board a vessel from Diego Garcia to Peros Banhos and,
later to the Seychelles. 137 She alleged that the harsh conditions she was subjected to
during this whole process caused her to miscarriage. The other individual plaintiff was
Mrs. France-Charlot, a first generation descendant of Chagossians who were originally
from Salomon Island. She alleged that as a result of the poverty her family suffered in
Mauritius, she suffered social, cultural and economic oppression. 138 Mr. Bancoult had
similar allegations. Mr. Bancoult also claimed that he had also had several job
applications rejected from the Diego Garcia base.
¶56
The original complaint was filed in December 2001 against the U.S., De Chazal Du
Mée & Co.(“DCDM”), 139 various current and former officials of the Departments of State
and Defense, and the Halliburton Corporation. 140 The plaintiffs alleged forced relocation,
torture, racial discrimination, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, genocide,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and trespass. 141 The plaintiffs also
moved for a preliminary injunction to bar the U.S. and DCDM from engaging in
allegedly discriminatory employment policies. 142 In response to a court order directing
them to clarify their claims, 143 the plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum in which
they stated that their claims were based on customary international law and the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA). 144 They made it clear that they were seeking declaratory relief,
injunctive relief and restitution. In this memorandum, the plaintiffs also alleged that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for cases
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such as this; and furthermore that no waiver of sovereign immunity was necessary for the
violation of jus cogens norms. 145
¶57
The defendants all responded by filing motions to dismiss. The U.S. argued that
the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because of the doctrines of sovereign
immunity and political question, while also claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 146
DCDM on the other hand, contended that they were ineffectively served with summons,
and that the plaintiffs had failed to allege either a statutory or a constitutional basis for
personal jurisdiction. 147 The individual defendants moved to dismiss based on the
statutory immunity granted to federal officers under the Federal Employee Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act (the “Westfall Act”), 148 a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction based on the political question doctrine, and statute of limitation grounds. 149
3. Initial Court Rulings
¶58

In September of 2002, the court issued a memorandum opinion with three principal
holdings. It ordered further briefing on the U.S.’s motion to dismiss because “neither the
complaint nor the plaintiffs’ subsequent submissions provided sufficient clarity about the
pending claims to allow [the] court to determine [the existence of] subject matter
jurisdiction.”150 It granted DCDM’s motion to dismiss 151 because the plaintiffs failed to
file a memorandum in opposition. 152 It also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction because it concluded that they did not demonstrate a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. 153 This in turn was based on three arguments. First
was the U.S.’s subject- matter jurisdiction concerns, i.e., that there is no such jurisdiction
without a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (which the U.S. did not grant). Second was
the contention that the plaintiffs could not satisfy certain elements of standing (more
specifically the conditions of causation and redressability), because the U.S. did not have
the power to grant or deny access to the Chagos. Third was the argument that the issues
presented by the case constituted a non-justiciable political question.
¶59
From November of 2002 until December of 2004, the parties and the court engaged
in a procedural ballet at the end of which only two defendants remained. 154 The final
145
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(D.D.C. 2003). The court granted leave to amend the complaint, and to add Brown & Root, however, it
denied the reinstatement of DCDM, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 8. Next, the plaintiffs moved to
146

116

Vol. 5:1]

Christian Nauvel

noteworthy procedural event happened in January of 2004, when the plaintiffs moved to
stay the case, pending the Supreme Court decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
296 (2004). 155 With the consent of both parties, this motion was granted. After the Sosa
decision, the stay was lifted and the parties were directed to submit further briefing on the
impact of the Supreme Court case.
B. The Court’s Holdings
¶60

All remaining motions were ruled upon by Judge Urbina, in December of 2004.
Because of the plaintiffs’ failure to rebut the Attorney General’s certification that the
individual defendants had acted within the scope of their employment, the court held that
they were immune to suit under the Westfall Act 156 and substituted the U.S. in their place,
making it the sole remaining defendant. The court then granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss, because it agreed that the suit raised nonjusticiable political questions that
precluded its review. 157
¶61
In this case, the Attorney General’s certification that the individuals had indeed
acted within the scope of their employment was given prima facie effect. 158 In other
words, it became the plaintiffs’ burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
this was not true. The plaintiffs argued that violations of jus cogens norms and
fundamental human rights could not possibly be within the scope of any employment. 159
However, the court did not agree with this characterization, concluding that the
individuals were only acting to further national (not personal) interests. 160 It was their job
to establish a military base on Diego Garcia, hence everything they did within the scope
of these orders was in an official capacity. 161
¶62
The plaintiffs then argued that their claims, which had been brought under the
Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) 162 and international law, fell within an exception to the
Westfall Act. 163 This exception saved those actions brought “for a violation of a Statute
of the United States” that authorizes such actions against an individual. 164 The plaintiffs
contended that the individual defendants had violated the ATCA by committing torts “in
permit discovery and to enlarge time, but this was also denied. The plaintiffs subsequently moved to
dismiss Halliburton and Brown & Root because of parallel litigation in the U.K. and this motion was
granted. The plaintiffs then filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the U.S.
from denying the plaintiffs’ request for a limited visit to the Chagos.
155
This case concerned the utilization of international norms as the basis of claims in federal court.
More specifically, it sought to clarify the exact scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 et
seq. (“FTCA”) and the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).
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defendant in the action in question. Bancoult et al. v. McNamara et al., 370 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2004)
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violation of the law of nations.”165 The court did not agree, finding that the ATCA was
“strictly a jurisdictional statute available to enforce a small number of international
norms.”166 Interpreting the statute in such a way as to trigger the Westfall Act’s
exception would mean that the ATCA confers substantive rights and imposes obligations
or duties, which, according to the court was not the case. 167 The plaintiffs then argued
that their claims fell within the exception because “violations of international law ‘arise
under’ the laws of the United States for purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331.”168
In other words, the plaintiffs argued that their claims presented a federal question since
“federal common law incorporates international law.”169 However, the court did not
accept this argument, holding that the Westfall Act is explicit in allowing an exception
only for violations of a statute or the U.S. Constitution – not federal common law or
international law. Hence, the court granted the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss.
¶63
Once the federal employees had been removed from the case, the sole remedy
available was to pursue an action aga inst the U.S. under the FTCA. 170 The FCTA “grants
federal district courts jurisdiction over claims arising from certain torts committed by
federal employees in the scope of their employment, and waives the government’s
sovereign immunity from such claims.”171 However, it also bars claimants from bringing
suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies. 172 The U.S.
claimed that the plaintiffs had failed to do so and should therefore be barred from
bringing suit. 173 The plaintiffs fo und themselves in a bind, having initially conceded that
they had not exhausted all administrative remedies. Though they subsequently tried to
retract the statement, 174 the court sided with the defendant, holding that there was no
waiver of immunity under the FTCA. 175
¶64
Though the case was technically resolved at this point, the court nevertheless
turned its attention to the question of subject matter jurisdiction, which was raised by the
defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The
basis for the defendant’s motion was the political question doctrine. This doctrine bars
judicial review when there are “controversies which revolve around policy choices and
value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or
the confines of the Executive Branch.”176
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Opposition to the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, at 12).
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167
Id. at 10.
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¶65

To determine whether there was a political question, the court considered the six
criteria laid out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 177 These criteria are: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or (3) the impossibility of deciding it without an initial policy determination
of a nonjudicial kind; or (4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing a lack of respect to other branches of government; or (5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question. 178 In Baker, the Supreme Court held that if any of these criteria were
found to be met, then the case would be nonjusticiable. 179
¶66
The plaintiffs argued that “they did not seek to adjudicate the lawfulness or
political wisdom of the United States’ decision to negotiate with the United Kingdom,
nor to establish a military base on Diego Garcia” but rather to assess the legality of the
policy’s implementation. 180 But the court disagreed. According to Judge Urbina, the
plaintiffs were really asking the court to assess the reasonableness of the Executive
Branch’s decision to depopulate the Chagos islands and ensure that the military base
there remains off- limits to non-authorized civilians. 181 The court concluded that since the
matter involved the U.S. government’s entry into (and execution of) an international
treaty, the political question doctrine precluded review. 182 The court reasoned that “the
Executive and Le gislative Branches’ conduct of military operations and foreign policy
complained of in this case, which raise national security concerns” are the exclusive
province of the President and Congress, and are therefore non-justiciable. 183
¶67
With respect to Baker, the court believed that the second, third, fifth and sixth
criteria were met. In regards to moving beyond the areas of judicial expertise, the court
reasoned that “[n]either federal law nor customary international law provide standards by
which the court can measure and balance the foreign policy considerations at play, such
as the containment of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean thirty years ago… and the
support of military operations in the Middle east [today].”184 It added that adjudication of
the case would demand it to “second guess the initial and continuing decisions of the
executive and legislative branches….”185 Concerning policy determinations reserved for
nonjudicial decision- makers, the court ruled that the plaintiffs were in effect asking it to
“substitute its judgment for that of the political branches and determine the national
defense needs of the U.S. military in the Indian Ocean.”186 Regarding the necessary
adherence to political decisions already made, the court found that the political branches
“decided thirty years ago to build and expand their military operations on Diego Garcia,
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despite its impact on the population.”187 Examination of the Congressional record also
showed that both Congress and the Executive were well aware of the potential
consequences of their actions. 188 The Court also found that the potential for
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments was also
present for similar reasons. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the case.
C. Analysis of the American Bancoult Case
¶68

As convinced one might be of the human rights violations involved in (and the
shared responsibility of the U.S. government for) the Chagossians’ forced removal, it
would be hard to fault the District of Columbia district court’s final conclusion (and
hence its affirmance on appeal). However, this does not mean that the courts involved
were acting in the best interests of justice. But as a district court judge bound both by
Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, Mr. Urbina had very little wriggle-room. What is
clear from this case is that the deck is (almost impossibly) stacked against foreign parties
wishing to obtain relief against either the U.S. or its employees.
1. What the Westfall Act and the FTCA Really Mean for International Plaintiffs

¶69

With respect to the potential liability of federal employees, the Westfall Act is a
practically impenetrable shield, providing for the substitution of the U.S. in the place of
individual defendants. The only two ways around it concern constitutional violations and
statutory violations, coupled with explicit congressional authorization for individual tort
liability. 189 However, this is not necessarily a bad thing – for after all it is nothing but a
statutory reincarnation of the Anglo-Saxon theory of respondeat superior – modified
slightly for the governmental context. What is truly troubling, however, is the way that
U.S. laws and jurisprudence combine to allow the federal government to escape its
responsibilities in the face of clear human rights violations.
¶70
The availability of the FTCA seems like a significant boon for international
plaintiffs, but in practice, the exceptions to the Act’s applicability cripple it almost to the
point of rendering it useless. The exhaustion of administrative remedies criterion, for
example, seems fairly harmless – but in conjunction with an unsympathetic court, it can
easily be transformed into a method for revoking FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
The exception makes good theoretical sense, since the contrary would probably lead to
inefficiency and might even undermine administrative agencies in general. However,
there needs to be some kind of reality check. The D.C. court did not even mention the
type of administrative remedies the plaintiffs should have sought before bringing suit.
One can only hypothesize that it would have involved some sort of petition to a
Department of Defense Agency for the right to return. Given that Chagossians were
consistently denied the right to work on Diego Garcia, it is highly unlikely that they
would have been allowed to return for any other reason. Judges from common law
countries are famed for their “balancing tests,” and this would have been an ideal setting
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for one. The interests of the plaintiffs should have been balanced against any
administrative concerns (such as efficiency).
2. The Political Question Doctrine Obsolete?
¶71

In terms of the application of the political question doctrine, encapsulated by the
directives in the seminal Baker v. Carr, 190 the D.C. district court cannot be faulted. Of
course, the six criteria are so vast that anything could potentially be a “political question.”
Considerations such as ensuring that the case’s resolution does not express a “lack of
respect” for a coordinate branch of government – are overly broad to say the least.
Through decisions such as Baker, the Supreme Court has granted lower courts far too
much discretion, should they wish to simply remove the case from the docket. 191 Hence,
an important issue is whether the Supreme Court should consider narrowing the Baker
factors to create a more reasonable test. Another underlying question is whether there
should even be a political question doctrine at all. Though proponents of the doctrine
defend it on separatio n of powers grounds, critics argue that it is unsafe to leave some
constitutional provisions solely to the political branches; for the Constitution itself was
meant to insulate certain matters from the political process. Hence, leaving some
provisions solely to elected officials may not be the wisest policy.
¶72
The D.C circuit’s affirmance of the district court’s ruling in Bancoult was a definite
setback for the Chagossian cause. 192 In terms of obtaining monetary compensation from
the U.S. government, through the U.S court system, the door may have been shut.
Although the Chagossians are considering an appeal to the Supreme Court, their chances
of being heard (let alone of succeeding) remain very slim. It would therefore be wise for
the Chagossians to consider an alternate forum for their grievances; somewhere where
there will not be as many obstacles to the airing of their substantive claims.
IV. ESTABLISHING LIABILITY FOR THE VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS
¶73

The result of the American Bancoult case proves that there is still a long way to go
in terms of obtaining legal relief for the Chagossians. Since the success of the British
cases, their cause has fared for the worse, with monetary damages proving to be a
sticking point for national courts on both sides of the Atlantic. In order to establish the
liability of at least the U.K and the U.S. governments, alternative routes will probably
have to be taken.
A. Liability of Corporations in National Courts

¶74

The potential liability of non-governmental third parties is one area that has not
been fully explored in the domestic courts (both British and American). The potential
certainly exists for success in this field (even in the U.S.), as can be seen from cases like
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y
2003). In this case, current and former residents of the Republic of the Sudan brought a
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class action suit under the ATCA, alleging that a Canadian energy company had
collaborated with the Sudanese government in a policy of ethnic cleansing; whereby
civilians were killed in order to facilitate oil exploration activities. 193 Especially relevant
is the fact that several of the substantive claims were similar to those of the Chagossians
(forcible displacement, property confiscation and destruction, kidnapping, and
genocide). 194
¶75
The court analyzed both domestic and international precedent on this issue, before
concluding that: (i) it had subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) the complaint sufficiently
alleged that the company had conspired with the Sudan to commit violations of the law of
nations; (iii) the complaint sufficiently alleged acts of torture, enslavement, war crimes,
and genocide; (iv) the Sudanese government's actions could be imputed to the company;
and (v) the company was subject to personal jurisdiction in New York. The underlying
message was that corporations (foreign or domestic) could indeed be held liable for jus
cogens violations in federal court. 195 However, a word of warning is necessary. With
respect to the facts of the Chagossian case, one can only assume that liability would be
harder to prove than in Talisman Energy, given that the U.K. and U.S. were the principal
perpetrators (as opposed to a Canadian energy company). For, as we have already
discussed, federal courts seem to be more amenable to finding corporations liable than
they do national governments.
B. Liability of States in International Courts
¶76

Another alternative for the Chagossians could be attempting to establish the States’
liability in International Courts and Arbitral Tribunals. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission and the various other monitoring bodies established under human rights
treaties generally do not have the power to render binding decisions. Exceptions are
regional institutions such as the European and the Inter-American Courts of Human
Rights, which were set up to ensure enforcement of the UDHR. The former might well
be a good option. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) might be another, although it
may be harder for the Chagossians to get standing.
1. The European Court of Human Rights

¶77

The European Court of Human Rights is an international court based in Strasbourg,
France. It can only hear matters pertaining to direct victims of human rights abuses
committed by members of the Council of Europe, 196 within the jurisdiction of the said
State. An additional requirement is that complainants must have used up all their
remedies on the national level – which, as has been discussed above, the Chagossians
seem to have done in the U.K.
¶78
Simply put, the European Court applies the ECHR, with a view to ensuring that
national governments respect the rights and guarantees set out therein. It does so by
examining complaints (known as “applications”) lodged by individuals or, sometimes, by
193
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States. Where it finds that a member has violated these rights and guarantees, the Court
delivers a binding judgment and monetary damages may be awarded. 197 Amongst the
many rights protected, is the right to respect for private and family life;198 and among the
prohibitions are “the expulsion by a State of its own nationals or its refusing them
entry.”199
¶79
The Chagossians currently have an application pending before the court with
respect to the human rights violations committed by the British Government. Essentially
they argue that the European Court has jurisdiction because the U.K. violated the rights
which the ECHR was designed to protect; and should therefore be held accountable. A
detailed analysis of the Chagossians’ claims and chances their of success in the European
Court goes beyond the scope of this Note; but it is hoped that a court designed to deal
with human rights abuses will be more willing to tackle such substantive issues head-on.
2. The ICJ and the Arguments that Could Be Heard There
¶80

Yet another potential venue for the Chagossians could be the ICJ. It is the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and it has a dual role: (1) to settle in
accordance with international law the legal disputes submitted to it by States; and (2) to
give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized international
organs and agencies. 200 Though the ICJ does not ordinarily provide standing to
individuals, it is possible to have a State present a claim on behalf of its citizens, provided
that certain conditions are met. For example, there needs to be a “genuine link” (often
more than just citizenship) between the individual and the State presenting his or her
claim. 201 The only State that fits the bill and could possibly agree to do so would be
Mauritius. The Chagossians should have no problem demonstrating a genuine link to this
country since they have resided there for over 30 years and hold citizenship. It is of
course up in the air as to whether Mauritius would be willing to risk compromising its
relationship with two global powers for the sake of a few of its most destitute citizens.
But assuming that they do, the Chagossians could well have a valid case.
¶81
At the time the Chagossians were relocated, the British relied on the vagueness of
international law with respect to forcible displacement to justify their position. See, for
example, the following excerpt from a 1968 minute, written by a Foreign Office legal
adviser:
“There is nothing wrong in law or in principle to enacting an immigration
law which enables the Commissioner to deport inhabitants of the BIOT.
Even in international law there is no established rule that a citizen has a
right to enter or remain in his country of origin/birth/nationality etc. A
provision to this effect is contained in Protocol No 4 to the European
197
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 UNTS 222 (1953) at Art. 8.
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Convention on Human Rights but that has not been ratified by us and thus
we do not regard the UK as bound by such a rule. In this respect we are
able to make up the rules as we go along and treat the inhabitants of BIOT
as not ‘belonging’ to it in any sense.”202
Even if such vagueness existed at the time (and it is highly doubtful that it did), the
Chagossians should be able to mount a significant case that this no longer holds true. In
addition to our suggested use of the British Bancoult cases as an international standard,
the existing norms of customary international law with respect to forced displacement are
very favorable to the Chagossians. See for example, the commentaries of scholars such
as Marco Simons, who wrote that “[t]he law of internally displaced persons is beginning
to recognize the notion that people have a right not to be displaced by their government
and international criminal law has now firmly embraced the idea that arbitrary forced
relocation may amount to a crime against humanity. 203 Although “few express
international legal norms exist which protect people against individual or collective
eviction and displacement or transfer,” existing international law norms “point to a
general rule according to which forced displacement may not be effected in a
discriminatory way or arbitrarily imposed.”204
¶82
In cases such as that of the Chagossians, where there is uncertainty, courts often
look to scholars and commentators’ opinions in order to determine what the law is. 205
Hence, though a norm against arbitrary forced relocation has not been expressly
articulated in major human rights instruments, “several analogous norms and
fundamental freedoms point to [such] a general prohibition.”206 For example: arbitrary
forced relocation is manifestly a gross violation of the freedom of movement and
residence, because individuals subject to it are denied the right to remain in (and often to
return to) their homes. 207 Article 13(1) of the UDHR guarantees “the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each State,” and is a guarantee that is
repeated in several other major human rights treaties. 208 A prohibition against forced
displacement is also subsumed within the right to freedom from arbitrary interference
with privacy and home life, and can be found within the same set of human rights
agreements. 209 Add to this the principle that (we argue) is embodied by the British
202
Regina v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ex parte Bancoult, [2001]
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Bancoult cases, and there is no doubt that some measure of protection against forced
displacement has attained the status of customary international law. 210
¶83
Recently, there has also emerged a clear trend of establishing criminal liability for
arbitrary relocation, especially across international borders, and during times of war.
Though the Chagossians’ relocation did not happen during a time of open conflict, it
certainly took place in the context of the Cold War, and across international borders; for
the BIOT was essentially part of the U.K., while Mauritius had gained independence by
the time of the Immigration Ordinance. If criminal liability seems a little far-fetched,
consider the following: relocations across international borders could constitute war
crimes under the Charters of the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals. 211 Similar provisions
can be found in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and for Rwanda. 212 Since then, in recognition of the internal nature of many modern
conflicts, the ICTY has found that the forced relocation of individuals within a single
country may also constitute a crime against humanity. 213 There is also a significant body
of law built up on the topic of stateless people. 214 Though this was one of Mr. Bancoult’s
claims in the original British case (i.e. that he had been rendered stateless), it will be a
tough one to argue in the ICJ, given that the Chagossians have always held dual
citizenship with both the U.K and Mauritius.
V. CONCLUSION
¶84

The Chagossians have come a long way (both literally and figuratively) in their
search for justice. They have been fighting for over thirty years, yet they remain as
determined as ever. Though the initial success of their litigation has been tempered by
recent setbacks, they remain convinced that they will eventually prevail. Many believe
that it is partly a matter of finding the right forum. Though national courts may well be
adequate for establishing the liability of corporations, they are not the easiest place to
defeat a State. This Note has proposed two alternate forums, where there will hopefully
be less resistance to hearing the plaintiffs’ substantive claims; and therefore a greater
chance to establish State liability. I have also suggested that the Chagossians should use
their combined victories in the British Bancoult cases as a principle of customary
international law when arguing for monetary damages in the future.
¶85
One final aspect of the Chagossians’ struggle that has not been discussed much in
this Note is politics. Despite our focus on the legal battles, political support for their
cause is vital to the Chagossians’ ultimate success. In more than one way, the District of
Columbia courts were not completely misguided when they labeled the issue a “political
question.” Given the national defense and the corporate interests involved, this is one of
those cases where the remedy is equally likely to be achieved via the political sphere.
But this will not happen without the Chagossians popularizing their cause and making
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.” Id.
210
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211
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212
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213
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214
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entered into force on 6 June 1960; and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, UN doc.
A/Conf.9/15, 30 Aug. 1961, entered into force on 13 Dec. 1975.
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their presence felt (in Mauritius, the U.K. and the U.S.). If through this Note I have
helped but a little in this respect, I will consider it a success.
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